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Abstract
This paper studies how to learn variational autoencoders with a variety of di-
vergences under differential privacy constraints. We often build a VAE with an
appropriate prior distribution to describe the desired properties of the learned
representations and introduce a divergence as a regularization term to close the
representations to the prior. Using differentially private SGD (DP-SGD), which
randomizes a stochastic gradient by injecting a dedicated noise designed according
to the gradient’s sensitivity, we can easily build a differentially private model.
However, we reveal that attaching several divergences increase the sensitivity from
O(1) to O(B) in terms of batch size B. That results in injecting a vast amount of
noise that makes it hard to learn. To solve the above issue, we propose term-wise
DP-SGD that crafts randomized gradients in two different ways tailored to the
compositions of the loss terms. The term-wise DP-SGD keeps the sensitivity at
O(1) even when attaching the divergence. We can therefore reduce the amount of
noise. In our experiments, we demonstrate that our method works well with two
pairs of the prior distribution and the divergence.
1 Introduction
Privacy-preserving data synthesis (PPDS) is a solution to sharing private data by constructing a
generative model while preserving privacy. Differential privacy (DP) [13] is a rigorous notation of
privacy to release statistics, and is used in broad domains and applications [3, 6, 9, 11, 27, 29, 31]. In
recent years, several works have proposed differentially private deep generative models [4, 20, 30, 33].
Deep generative models have significantly improved in the past few years. Variational autoencoder
(VAE) [21, 22] is a likelihood-based model to reconstruct training inputs. VAE also enables us to
generate random samples from its learned representations. We often build a VAE with an appropriate
prior distribution to describe the desired properties of the representations (such as encouraging
clustering, sparsity, and disentanglement), and introduce a divergence as a regularization term to close
the learned representations to the prior [5, 8, 16, 17, 24]. This paper studies how to learn variational
autoencoders with a variety of divergences under differential privacy constraints.
A simple way to build a differentially private VAE is to employ differentially private stochastic
gradient descent (DP-SGD) [2] in the learning process of vanilla VAE. The key idea of DP-SGD
is that it injects noises to stochastic gradients for giving DP guarantees to the learned parameters.
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The noise scale is designed according to the stochastic gradient’s sensitivity, which is the maximal
change of the gradient when any single input is modified. To limit the gradient’s sensitivity, DP-SGD
first decomposes input samples into disjoint smaller groups (i.e., micro-batches). Then, DP-SGD
computes a stochastic gradient for each group and clips the norm of the gradient by a constant. On
the other hand, a misuse of the gradient aggregations might cause privacy leakages unconsciously.
Our contributions are three-fold. First, we reveal that several divergences might increase the stochastic
gradients’ sensitivity when attaching them to the loss function. To discover the issues, we address a
sensitivity study in the learning process of VAEs based on DP-SGD. The sensitivity is increased from
O(1) to O(B) in terms of batch size B by attaching the divergence. Consequently, the sensitivity
increase degrades the quality of the learned model since it directly amplifies the amount of noise. If
unfortunately, we do not notice the sensitivity increase, we might cause an insufficient differential
privacy guarantee.
Second, to solve the above issue, we propose term-wise DP-SGD that crafts randomized gradients
in two different ways tailored to the compositions of the loss terms. The term-wise DP-SGD keeps
the sensitivity at O(1) even when attaching the divergence. We can therefore build a differentially
private VAE with a small amount of noise by our proposed method.
Third, based on the term-wise DP-SGD, we present PRIVAE, a general model to learn VAEs with
attaching a variety of divergences while satisfying differential privacy. Our experiments demonstrate
that our proposed method works well with two pairs of the prior distribution and the divergence.
This paper clarifies how to aggregate gradients in VAEs to satisfy differential privacy while refraining
the amount of noise. Although we mainly study differentially private VAEs, these contributions also
have significant importance for the other machine learning models to satisfy differential privacy.
1.1 Related Works
Generative models under differential privacy have been studied in a last decade. Traditional ap-
proaches are based on capturing probabilistic models, low rank structure, and learning statistical
characteristics from original sensitive database [12, 35, 36]. Plausible deniability [10] is an extended
privacy metric behind DP for building a generative model.
We have several studies about DP-SGD [26, 25, 34]. Lee et al. [23] demonstrated that DP-SGD can
be improved with adaptive step sizes and careful allocation of privacy budgets between iterations.
Bagdasaryan et al. [7] revealed that if the original model is unfair, the unfairness becomes worse
once DP is applied.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [13, 14, 15] is a rigorous mathematical privacy definition, which quantitatively
evaluates the degree of privacy protection when we publish statistical outputs. The definition of
differential privacy is as follows:
Definition 1 ((ε, δ)-differential privacy) A randomized mechanism M : D → Z satisfies (ε, δ)-
differential privacy if, for any two neighboring input D,D′ ∈ D and any subset of outputs Z ⊆ Z , it
holds that
Pr[M(D) ∈ Z] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[M(D′) ∈ Z] + δ. (1)
Practically, we employ a randomized mechanismM that ensures differential privacy for a function f .
The mechanismM perturbs the output of f to cover f ’s sensitivity that is the maximum degree of
change over any pairs of D and D′.
Definition 2 (Sensitivity) The sensitivity of f for any two neighboring input D,D′ ∈ D is
∆f = sup
D,D′∈D
||f(D)− f(D′)||. (2)
where || · || is a norm function defined on f ’s output domain.
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Based on the sensitivity of f , we design the degree of noise to ensure differential privacy. Laplace
mechanism and Gaussian mechanism are well-known as standard approaches.
Let M1, . . . ,Mk be mechanisms satisfying (ε1, δ1)-, . . . , (εk, δk)-differential privacy, respectively.
Then, a mechanism sequentially applying M1, . . . ,Mk satisfies (
∑
i∈[k] εi,
∑
i∈[k] δi)-differential
privacy. This fact refers to composability[13]. In particular, this composition is called sequential
composition.
2.2 DP-SGD
Differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) [2], is a useful optimization technique
for learning a model f under differential privacy constraints. The key idea of DP-SGD is that it
adds noise to stochastic gradients during training for making differential privacy guarantees on f ’s
parameters θ. To obtain the scale of noise, DP-SGD limits `2-sensitivity of stochastic gradient g by
clipping its norm. The gradient clipping piC that limits the sensitivity up to C is denoted as follows:
piC(g) = g ∗min
(
1,
C
||g||2
)
(3)
In the DP-SGD, we compute an empirical loss for each micro-batch that includes only one sample.
For each micro-batch, DP-SGD generates its clipped gradient. Based on the clipped gradients,
DP-SGD crafts a randomized gradient g˜ through computing the average over the clipped gradients
and adding noise whose scale is defined by C and σε, where σε is noise scaler to satisfy (ε, δ)-DP.
g˜ =
1
B
∑
i∈[B]
piC(gi) +N (0, (σεC)2I)
 . (4)
At last, DP-SGD takes a step based on the randomized gradient g˜. Abadi et al. [2] also proposed a
moment accountant that maintain privacy loss more precisely than the sequential composition. In the
moment accountant, σε has the following relationship against ε and δ (Theorem 1 in [2]).
σε ≥ c2 q
√
T log(1/δ)
ε
(5)
where q is a sampling probability, T is a number of steps and c2 is a constant number. To compute
the privacy loss through moment accountant, we can utilize a useful tool in Tensorflow privacy [1].
2.3 Variational Autoencoder
Variational autoencoder (VAE) [22] is a model to learn parametric latent variables by maximizing
the marginal log-likelihood of the training data points. VAE consists of two parts, inference model
q(z|x) for an encoder g(x; θ), and the likelihood model p(x|z) for a decoder f(z; θ).
Variational evidence lower bound. Introduction of an approximate posterior qφ(z|x) enable us to
construct variational evidence lower bound (ELBO) on log-likelihood log p(x) as
LELBO = log p(x)−DKL(q(z|x)||p(x|z))
= Eq(z|x)[log p(x|z)]−DKL(q(z|x)||p(z))
≤ log p(x).
(6)
To implement encoder and decoder as a neural network, we need to backpropagate through random
sampling. However, such backpropagation does not flow through the random samples. To overcome
this issue, VAE introduces the reparametrization trick. The trick can be described as z = µ + Σ
where  ∼ N (0, I). After constructing VAE, we can generate random samples following the two
steps; 1) choose a latent vector z ∼ N (0, σ2I), and 2) generate x˜ by decoding z. x˜ = f(z).
Attaching a divergence for regularization. To capture the desired property in the learned repre-
sentation space of VAEs, we can employ a variety of prior distributions as p(z) and an additional
regularization term. We assume an additional regularization term D(q(z), p(z)), that is a divergence
between q(z) and p(z). The ELBO with the regularization is described as follows:
LELBO = Eq(z|x)[log p(x|z)]− βDKL(q(z|x)||p(z))− αD(q(z), p(z)) (7)
Several D(q(z), p(z)) are difficult to be decomposed into micro-batch losses that DP-SGD requires.
3
3 Sensitivity Analysis
Here we address a sensitivity study in DP-SGD for VAEs with various loss functions to clarify the
required nose scale for ensuring differential privacy on the parameters of VAEs.
3.1 Learning VAEs in DP-SGD
Let batch = {xi}Bi=1 is a randomly selected samples with sampling probability B/N . We assume
the loss function of VAE is formed as the following abstract equation:
L = −LELBO = Ex [φ(x)] + ψ(batch) (8)
where φ(xi) is a function which computes a loss only depend on xi, and ψ(batch) is a function
which computes loss value across all samples in batch (={x1, . . . , xB}). We call φ(xi) sample-wise
term, and ψ(batch) batch-wise term. The loss function (8) is also rewritten as follows:
L = 1B
∑
i∈[B] Li = 1B
∑
i∈[B] (φ(xi) + ψ(batch)) (9)
where Li is a micro-batch loss. In DP-SGD, the stochastic gradient of Li is clipped by C as (3). That
means the sensitivity of the gradient is bounded by the constant. At the last step in a batch, we craft a
randomized gradient through aggregating the clipped gradients and injecting noise whose scale is
Cσε to ensure differential privacy. This aggregation has an effort to reduce the variance of the noise.
We call the construction of (9) micro aggregation.
Based on the above assumptions, we can see the following series of propositions.
Proposition 1 Assume Li = φ(xi) and the stochastic gradient of Li is clipped by (3) with the
constant C, `2-sensitivity of L is C.
Proof Let gi be the stochatic gradient of Li = φ(xi). Since φ(xi) is independent from φ(xj) of
j 6= i, changing xi only modifies its clipped gradient piC(gi). Thus, the sensitivity is 1× C.
Proposition 2 Assume Li = ψ(batch) and the stochastic gradient of Li is clipped by (3) with the
constant C, `2-sensitivity of L is BC.
Proof Let gi be the stochatic gradient of Li = ψ(batch). While ψ(batch) is shared in all Lj ,∀j ∈ [B], the change of xi modifies all Lj . Thus, the sensitivity is B × C.
Proposition 3 Assume Li = φ(xi) + ψ(batch) and the stochastic gradient of Li is clipped by (3)
with the constant C, `2-sensitivity of L is BC.
Proof As well as the Proof of Proposition 2, since ψ(batch) is shared in all Lj , ∀j ∈ [B], the
change of xi modifies all Lj . Thus, the sensitivity is B × C.
From the above three propositions, we reach the following theorem about the sensitivity for learning
differentially private VAEs in the DP-SGD manner.
Theorem 1 `2-sensitivity of L for learning a vanilla VAE is either BC or C.
Proof Let reci be the reconstruction loss (i.e., negative log-likelihood) of xi. The loss functions of
vanilla VAE can be written as Li = reci + KL(q(z|x)||p(z)). For this formulation, the sensitivity is
BC from the proposition 3. Fortunately, the KL term can be decomposed as follows:
KL(q(z|x)||p(z)) = 1
B
∑
i∈[B]
(log q(z|xi)− log p(z)) (10)
Thus we can rewrite the loss as sample-wise form that does not depend on the other samples:
Li = reci + kldi where kldi = log q(z|xi)− log p(z) (11)
From Proposition 1, the sensitivity when we utilize (11) is C.
Lemma 1 Let a VAE introduces an additional regularization term and the regularization term cannot
be decomposed into micro-batch losses that every micro-batch depends on an only single input. The
sensitivity of DP-SGD for learning the VAE with the regularization is BC.
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On the other hand, DP-SGD is applicable not only for micro-batches but also for the overall batch
(L = ψ(batch)). When we craft the randomized gradient from the overall batch, the stochastic
gradient’ sensitivity keeps at O(1). We call this construction batch aggregation. By employing the
batch aggregation, we can compute a divergence from all samples in the batch without increasing
the sensitivity. However, the batch aggregation also injects a large amount of noise because it does
not have a factor to reduce the noise that micro-batch organizations have. Therefore, DP-SGD often
organizes the micro-batches whose size is one for crafting the randomized gradient.
3.2 Privacy Leakage
As discussed the above study, ill constructions of the randomized gradient that aggregates micro-
batch losses like Li = reci + kldi + D(q(z), p(z)) and injects insufficient scale of noise to cover
the increased sensitivity fail into differential privacy guarantee that we expected. In this case,
unfortunately, the information of D(q(z), p(z)) that depends on inputs of the whole batch is leaked.
By this leaked sensitive information, we might get beautiful results, but it is the result of our poor
understanding of gradient constructions in the DP-SGD manner.
3.3 Augmentation for Estimating Reconstruction Error
Back to the original VAE [22], the stochastic gradient variational Bayes (SGVB) estimator enables us
to compute the ELBO over a single batch as:
LELBO(xi) = −Li = −kldi + 1
L
L∑
l=1
log p(xi|zi,l) (12)
In the original VAE, we can set L = 1 if the batch size is large enough 2. However, DP-SGD assumes
micro-batches whose size is 1. In order to accurately estimate the log-likelihood around xi, we should
set L in no small number. Thanks to gradient clipping (3), the sensitivity is still bounded by C even
when utilizing a large L. Since 1L
∑
l∈[L] log p(xi|zi,l) is independent from xj 6=i, and the stochastic
gradient including it is clipped by the constant C, the sensitivity is bounded by C against any L.
From the above discussion, we can utilize augmentations that reduce the reconstruction error without
increasing the sensitivity. However, it consumes much more computational time and memory spaces.
4 Proposed Method
Based on the sensitivity analysis, we present how to learn differentially private variational autoen-
coders with suppressing the amount of noise. We first introduce a general model PRIVAE that learns
variational autoencoder in a differentially private way. Second, we propose a novel learning technique
term-wise DP-SGD that reduces the amount of noise for DP by decomposing stochastic gradients
into term-wise components. Our proposed method also utilizes the augmentation that attempts to
reduce the reconstruction error, as discussed in section 3.3.
4.1 PRIVAE: a general model of differentially private VAE
Our basic idea is to decompose the terms of the loss function into two groups and compose a
noisy gradient that ensures the DP group by group. For each group, we separately run the gradient
aggregation sequence for DP, which consists of computing stochastic gradients, clipping gradients,
and adding noise as following the DP-SGD manner.
Towards reducing the amount of noise, we first introduce the notation of partitions. Let s be a partition
of batch, where s = {x1, . . . , x|s|}, xi ∈ batch. Any pairs of sj and sk (j 6= k) are mutually disjoint,
that is sj ∩ sk 6=j = ∅.
Objective function of PRIVAE. PRIVAE minimizes the objective function described below:
L = Lsample + Lbatch = Ex [φ(x)] + Es [ψ(s)] = 1B
∑
i∈[B] φ(xi) +
1
b
∑
j∈[b] ψ(sj) (13)
where φ(x) = rec(x) + βkld(x), ψ(s) = αD(q(z), p(z)) and s is the partition denoted the above.
Let b is the number of the partitions, and
⋃
j∈[b] sj = batch. Note, (13) with b = 1 is identical to (8).
2[22] mentioned that L can be set to 1 as long as the minibatch size was large enough. e.g. B = 100.
5
Algorithm 1 Termwise DP-SGD
Input: x1, . . . , xN
Parameters: learning rate ηt, noise scale σ′ε, batch size B, #partitions b, clipping size C1 and C2
Initialize θ0 randomly
for t in [T ] do
randomly sample batch with probability B/N
g¯sample ←
∑
i∈[B] piC1(∇θtφ(xi; θt))
randomly sample sub-group sj from batch with probability b/B
g¯batch ←
∑
j∈[b] piC2(∇θtψ(sj ; θt))
g˜← 1B (g¯sample +N (0, (σ′εC1)2I)) + 1b (g¯batch +N (0, (σ′εC2)2I))
θt+1 ← θt − ηtg˜
end for
Output: θT
4.2 Termwise DP-SGD
We propose termwise DP-SGD that composes noisy gradient for DP in a term-wise way. The
termwise DP-SGD crafts the noisy gradients for sample-wise terms φ(xi) and batch-wise terms
ψ(sj), separately. In the last phase of termwise DP-SGD, it combines these noisy gradients and
updates parameters θ. The overall proposed procedure of termwise DP-SGD is in Algorithm 1.
Gradient aggregation for sample-wise term. For each sample-wise term φ(xi), we craft its
clipped gradient piC1(∇θφ(xi; θ)) with clip size C1. We then aggregate the sum of the clipped
gradients as follows:
g¯sample =
∑
i∈[B] piC1(∇θφ(xi; θ)). (14)
Gradient aggregation for batch-wise term. For the batch-wise terms ψ(sj), we first partition
batch into sub-groups s1, . . . , sb where b ≤ B. We then compute ψ(sj) for j ∈ [b] and aggregate
their clipped gradients with clip size C2 as described below:
g¯batch =
∑
j∈[b] piC2(∇θψ(sj ; θ)). (15)
Term-wise noise injections and concatenation. Finally we combine the above two gradients as
g˜ =
1
B
(
g¯sample +N (0, (σ′εC1)2I)
)
+
1
b
(
g¯batch +N (0, (σ′εC2)2I)
)
. (16)
where σ′ε = κσε, κ =
σε/2
σε
= 2
√
log δ/2
log δ if C2 > 0, otherwise κ = 1. κ can be derived from (5). The
ratio of C2 to C1 plays an important role that adjusts the scale of (15) against (14) like α.
4.3 Discussion
We here discuss the privacy guarantee and noise scale of our proposed method.
Theorem 2 Term-wise DP-SGD with the noise scale σ′ε satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if DP-SGD
with σε satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy for a VAE that has no batch-wise terms.
Proof σ′ε = κσε is the noise scale that satisfies (ε/2, δ/2)-DP. From the sequential composition of
the first term and the second term in (16), the sum of the two terms satisfies (ε, δ)-DP.
Lemma 2 `2-sensitivity of L (13) is C1 + C2. That means the sensitivity is O(1).
Proof Since all sj and sk 6=j are disjoint, the change of any single xi ∈ batch influences only φ(xi)
and ψ(sj) where xi ∈ sj . Thus, `2-sensitivity of Lsample and Lbatch is C1 and C2, respectively.
Finally, `2-sensitivity of L is C1 + C2.
In (13) and (16), the computation of ψ for each partition results in under-estimation against ψ(batch),
but it brings the reduction of the noise variance for the second term. In (16), the noiseN (0, (σ′εC2)2I)
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Table 1: Sensitivity and noise scale for learning differentially private models with a batch-wise term.
L `2-sensitivity of L noise scale
DP-SGD (micro agg.) 1B
∑B
i=1(φ(xi) + ψ(batch)) BC Cσε
DP-SGD (batch agg.) ψ(batch) C Cσε
Term-wise DP-SGD 1B
∑B
i=1 φ(xi) +
1
b
∑b
j=1 ψ(sj) C1 + C2 (
C1
B +
C2
b )κσε
(a) Sparsity (b) Log-likelihood (c) MMD(qφ(z), p(z))
Figure 1: Our model PRIVAE works with MMD as a regularization term, and obtains sparsity.
can be divided by the number of partitions b. Therefore, we can manipulate the degree of the trade-off
between the estimation accuracy of ψ(batch) and the second term’s noise scale by b.
Finally, we discuss the noise scale. In the existing method DP-SGD with a divergence, the overall
noise scale is Σε = BCσεB = Cσε. While our term-wise DP-SGD has Σ
′
ε =
C1σ
′
ε
B +
C2σ
′
ε
b ≈
2
(
C1
B +
C2
b
)
σε by using σ′ε = κσε ≈ 2σε. In the DP-SGD with divergence, the order of the noise
scale can be written as O(1), while our proposed method has O(1/b) since B ≥ b.
Table 1 summarizes the sensitivity and noise scale of DP-SGD and our term-wise DP-SGD.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method PRIVAE with two different
tasks. We evaluate our method in a sparse coding task and a clustering task. Each task employs a
different prior distribution as p(z) and divergence as the regularization term ψ(s). The experimental
settings, including datasets, neural network architectures, construction of prior distributions, regular-
ization divergences, and evaluation metrics, follow the experiments in [24]. The experimental codes
are developed in Python 3.7 and PyTorch 1.5 [28] and run on machines with a Tesla V100 GPU.
5.1 Sparsity
We first consider a sparse representation that only a small fraction of available factors are employed
for reconstructions. In this task, we utilize the Fashion-MNIST dataset [32]. As well as [24],
we construct a sparse prior as p(z) = Πd(1 − γ)N (zd; 0, 1) + γN (zd; 0, σ20) with σ20 = 0.05.
This mixture distribution can be interpreted as a mixture of samples being either off or on, whose
proportion is set by γ. We set γ=0.8. The regularization term we utilize here is a dimension-wise
MMD with a sum of Cauchy kernels on each dimension (k(x,y) =
∑D
d=1
∑L
`
σ`
σ`=1+(xd−yd)2 ) with
σ` ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 1, 2, 4, 10}. To measure a sparsity of the latent representations, we employ the sparsity
metric defined with the Hoyer extrinsic metric [18] as follows:
Sparsity = 1n
∑
i∈[n] Hoyer(z¯i), Hoyer(y) =
√
d−‖y‖1/‖y‖2√
d−1 (17)
where z¯i is a vector whose d-th dimensional value z¯i,d = zi,d/σ(zi,d). σ(zi,d) is the standard
deviation of d-th dimentional latent encoding taken over the dataset. The Hoyer(y) ∈ [0, 1] represents
0 for fully dense vector and 1 for a fully sparse vector.
We use the same convolutional neural networks for both the encoder and decoder as in [24] with
D=50 dimensional latent space. In this task, we use SGD optimizer with C1=0.05, η=0.001, β=1,
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(a) PRIVAE (ε = 2.87) (b) PRIVAE with KL(p(z)||q(z)) (ε = 2.87)
Figure 2: PRIVAE works for reconstructions with clustering representations. (a) and (b) show
reconstructions (yellow) of the pinwheel data (red) and the learned representations (blue) for PRIVAE
and PRIVAE with KL(p(z)||q(z)), respectively. PRIVAE with KL(p(z)||q(z)) demonstrates good
reconstructions and representations for clustered pinweels, but PRIVAE without it shows poor results.
B=256, b=16, L=1 for all privatized models, and C2=0.005 for PRIVAE with the MMD and C2=0 for
PRIVAE without it. For non-private VAEs, we use Adam optimizer with η=0.0005, B=256. For both
VAE and PRIVAE, we set α=100 when attaching the MMD. We also compare with DP-SGD using
micro-agg. and batch-agg.. For these methods, we set C=0.0002 to avoid exploding gradients. The
other hyper-parameters are the same as PRIVAE with MMD. All models are trained in 10 epochs.
Figure 1 shows the substantial sparsity by the sparse prior (Figure 1a), the log-likelihood (Figure
1b), and the MMD between q(z) and p(z) (Figure 1c), those results are observed at several privacy
parameter ε. We plot the average over ten observations. The shaded regions are ± 1 standard
deviation around the averages. In Figure 1a, PRIVAE with the regularization (PRIVAE +MMD)
demonstrates higher sparsity than the model that does not have it. Although it has a gap between the
non-private regularized model (VAE+MMD), our proposed model achieved increasing the sparsity
even under differential privacy constraints. In the MMD between q(z) and p(z), PRIVAE +MMD
shows smaller values against PRIVAE without it. By employing the regularization term, PRIVAE
could obtain the sparsity and reduce the MMD, but it was not easy to simultaneously increase the
log-likelihood. The trade-off between them seems more significant than non-private models. To
obtain more sparsity, PRIVAE needs to improve reconstruction performance.
5.2 Clustering Latent Space
Next, we consider a differentially private VAE that wishes to impose clustering of the latent space.
For this experiment, we utilize the pinwheel dataset from [19], with n=400 observations, clustered
in 4 spirals. Following the experiment in [24], we utilize a mixture of four Gaussians as the prior,
KL(p(z)||q(z)) as a regularization divergence, and fully-connected neural networks for both encoder
and decoder. The prior is defined as p(z) =
∑K
k=1 pi
k
∏D
d=1N (z|µkd, σkd) with D=2, K=4, σkd=0.03,
pik=1/K, and µkd ∈ {0, 1}. The divergence is defined as KL(p(z)||q(z)) ≈
∑|s|
j=1(log p(zj) −
log
∑|s|
i=1 q(zj |xi)). We set C1=0.05, η=0.01, B=20, b=1, L=20 for all models, C2=0.0005, β=0 for
PRIVAE with KL(p(z)||q(z)) and C2=0, β=1 for PRIVAE without it.
We compare the clustering performance between PRIVAE with/out the regularization term
KL(p(z)||q(z)). Figure 2 shows the reconstructions of the pinwheel data and the (clustered) repre-
sentations. The first two columns demonstrate the results of PRIVAE without KL(p(z)||q(z)), and
the others show those of PRIVAE with KL(p(z)||q(z)). In the figures the red dots represent the
original inputs, the yellow dots are their reconstructions, and the blue dots show the data points in the
latent spaces. PRIVAE without the regularization demonstrates poor reconstructions against the raw
pinwheel clustered data. While, PRIVAE with KL(p(z)||q(z)) generated better reconstructions than
the model without it even though the generated samples have small reconstruction errors. The learned
representations of PRIVAE with the regularization are well clustered and fitted to the prior that is the
four mixture of Gaussians. Through these results, our proposed model worked well with employing
the prior and the regularization term those intended to capture the clusters of the pinwheel data.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studied how to learn variational autoencoders with various divergence under differential
privacy constraints. We revealed several divergences increase the sensitivity of the stochastic gradient
from O(1) to O(B) in terms of batch size B. To reduce the sensitivity and the amount of noise, we
proposed a term-wise DP-SGD that crafted randomized gradients in two different ways tailored to
the compositions of the loss terms. The term-wise DP-SGD could keep the sensitivity at O(1) even
when attaching the divergence. In our experiments, we demonstrated that our method worked well
with two pairs of the prior distribution and the divergence. We mainly studied differentially private
VAEs, but these contributions also have significant importance for the other machine learning models
required to satisfy differential privacy.
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